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Trusted Computing
• We start by introducing the notion of Trusted Computing.
• The notion originates from the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) 
– in fact from its predecessor body, the TCPA.
• The first fruits of what has been a large scale research and 
development effort are now visible in the form of a secure chip 
on the motherboards of many new PCs.
• Microsoft Vista incorporates support for these chips, and uses 
them as the basis for certain novel security functions.
• Open source software also exists that is capable of exploiting 
this hardware.
• However, the full potential of the hardware remains to be 
exploited.
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A trusted system
• A trusted system or component is one that behaves in the 
expected manner for a particular purpose.
[Trusted Computing Group – www.trustedcomputinggroup.org]
• This is difficult to achieve this for a PC – where typically there is 
no way of telling whether the ‘real’ (uncorrupted) Windows is 
running.
• As a result there is no way of getting any confidence in the 
correct running of applications.  [Even if the operating system 
says that everything is OK, then this does not help because it 
cannot be believed].
• It is even more difficult to prove to a third party that the state 
of a PC is as claimed.
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Fundamental requirements
• First we need a way of achieving assurance that the operating 
system has booted correctly.
• This requires assuming that the PC hardware has not been 
modified; this is made difficult, but not impossible, for the 
attacker by embedding key functions in a dedicated chip – the 
Trusted Platform Module (TPM).
• Need a way of checking the boot process.
• The component that checks the initial boot must be trusted –
the ‘Core Root of Trust’ – this is hardware-based.
• If the loaded software has been checked (and hence is reliable),
it can check the next software to be loaded, and again there is a 
solid basis for trust; this process is iterated.
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Monitoring the checking
• As well as performing checks during the boot process, there 
needs to be a reliable way of recording the results of each of 
these checks.
• The trusted hardware incorporates hardware registers which 
store hash-codes of software that has been loaded – these 
registers provide a reliable record of all the software that has
been executed on the trusted platform.
• Anyone wishing to check the state of the platform only needs to 
be given the contents of these registers (as long as they know 
what the values ‘ought to be’).
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Building on the trusted base
• This base of trust can be used to support two fundamental 
trusted computing functions:
– Attestation, where a PC can reliably attest to its software state to 
a third party (by describing the contents of the registers which
store hashes of software state);
– Secure storage, where a PC can store data in such a way that 
only if the PC is in a specific trusted state will the data be 
decrypted and available to an application (by linking the decryption 
keys to specific register contents).
• We now look in a little more detail at the set of technical 
functions provided by trusted computing (as needed to support 
the fundamentals we have outlined).
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Components of a trusted computing 
framework
• Shielded locations and protected capabilities:
– Protected capabilities are those capabilities whose correct operation is 
necessary for the platform to be trusted;
– Shielded locations are areas in which data is protected against 
interference or snooping;
– Only protected capabilities have access to shielded locations.
• Attestation:
– Attestation by the TPM;
– Attestation to a trusted platform (incorporating a TPM);
– Attestation of a trusted platform;
– Authentication of a trusted platform.
• Integrity measurement, storage and reporting.
[TCG specification Architecture Overview]
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Current platforms with integrated TPMs
Hardware
Operating system
Applications
Data
TPM
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Envisaged trusted platforms (stage 1)
Hardware
Operating system
Applications
Data
TPM
CRTM
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Envisaged trusted platforms (stage 2)
Hardware
Virtual machine monitor/ Hypervisor/ Isolation layer
Data-1
Application-a
Application-b
Guest OS
TPM CRTM
Data-2
Application-c
Application-d
Guest OS
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Envisaged trusted platforms (stage 3)
Hardware (including hardware support for isolation –
CPU, chipset, keyboard, mouse, video graphics card
extensions)
Virtual machine monitor/ Hypervisor/ Isolation layer
Data-1
Application-a
Application-b
Guest OS
TPM
Data-2
Application-c
Application-d
Guest OS
CRTM and DRTM
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The TCPA
• TCPA (Trusted Computing Platform Alliance): An industry 
working group.
• Focus: Enhancing trust and security in computing platforms.
• Originally an alliance of promoter companies (HP, IBM, Intel and
Microsoft).  Founded in 1999.
• Initial draft standard unveiled in late 1999.
• Invitation then extended to other companies to join the alliance.
• Specification eventually became an open industry standard.
• By 2002 the TCPA had over 150 member companies.
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The TCG
• TCG: announced April 8, 2003.
• TCPA recognised TCG as successor organisation for the 
development of trusted computing specifications.
• TCG adopted the specifications of the TCPA.
• Aims:
– To extend the specifications for multiple platform types;
– To complete software interface specifications to facilitate 
application development and interoperability;
– To ensure backward compatibility.
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The TCG main specifications
• TCG TPM main specification (general platform specification) 
version 1.2:
– Design principles;
– Structures of the TPM;
– TPM commands.
• TCG software stack (TSS) specification version 1.2.
• TCG software stack (TSS) specification header file.
• Specifications available at:
• www.trustedcomputinggroup.org
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The trusted platform subsystem (TPS)
• The TPS is composed of three fundamental elements:
– The root of trust for measurement (RTM);
– The trusted platform module (TPM), which is the root of trust for 
storage (RTS) and the root of trust for reporting (RTR); and
– The TCG software stack (TSS), which encompasses the software 
on the platform that supports the platform’s TPM.
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Roots of trust
• The RTM:
– The RTM is a computing engine which accurately generates at 
least one integrity measurement representing a software 
component running on the platform;
– The measurement digest is then recorded in a platform 
configuration register (PCR) in the TPM;
– Details of the measuring process, namely the measured value, is 
then recorded to the stored measurement log (SML) outside the 
TPM.
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Roots of trust
• For the foreseeable future, it is envisaged that the RTM will be
integrated into the normal computing engine of the platform, 
where the provision of additional BIOS boot block or BIOS 
instructions (the Core Root of Trust for Measurement, or CRTM) 
cause the main platform processor to function as the RTM.
• Ideally, however, for the highest level of security, the CRTM 
would be part of the TPM.
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Roots of trust
• The RTS and RTR:
– The RTS is a collection of capabilities which must be trusted if
storage of data inside a platform is to be trusted:
• The RTS provides integrity and confidentiality protection to data used 
by the TPM but that is stored externally;
• It also provides a mechanism to ensure that the release of certain 
data only occurs in a named environment.
– The RTR is a collection of capabilities that must be trusted if 
reports of integrity measurements which represent the platform 
state are to be trusted.
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The TSS
• The TCG software stack (TSS) is the software on the platform 
which supports the TPM.
• The challenger must determine whether TSS functions can be 
trusted by examining integrity metrics.
• The TSS architecture consists of a number of software modules, 
which provide fundamental resources to support the TPM:
– The TPM Device Driver;
– TPM Core Services;
– TPM Service Provider.
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The TPM components
I/O
HMAC engine
Cryptographic co-
processor Key generation 
RNG
Power detection
Execution environment
Volatile memory
SHA-1 engine
Opt-in
Non-volatile 
memory
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Limits to TC hardware capabilities
• The notion underlying trusted computing is to reliably measure 
and report on the software running on a machine.
• This is fine for a simple machine, for which software will not 
often change (e.g. dedicated systems).
• However, for a PC this is infeasible.
• The operating system alone (e.g. Windows) is incredibly large 
and complex, and has a very large number of versions.
• If applications are added to this, then the problem of deciding 
whether or not a given state is trustworthy becomes impossible.
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Isolation layer
• Instead, the idea is to measure all software only up to a certain 
point, and then to rely on the software to ‘look after itself’.
• If the measured software provides the basis for virtualisation 
and secure compartments for individual processes, then we 
should be in good shape.
• This is the idea behind the isolation layer.
• An isolation layer is a small, secure, mini-operating system, 
which is measured by the trusted computing hardware, and 
which takes care of the security of subsequently run 
applications.
• Microsoft has described what its isolation layer would be like 
(NGSCB), and there are a variety of open source initiatives 
(including OpenTC). 
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Software security – What TC cannot do
• Software vulnerabilities result from both:
– Design errors;
– Coding errors.
• TC technology will not prevent vulnerabilities, or aid in the 
development of secure software without vulnerabilities.
• Vulnerabilities can be attacked by viruses and worms at any 
time.
• TC technology will not stop viruses/malicious code being written
or circulated
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The isolation layer – What TC can do
• Security of the isolation layer code itself:
– Execution of the isolation layer in ring -1:
• Physical separation of the isolation layer;
• Size of isolation layer – relatively small number of lines of code;
• (possibly) provably secure.
Helps prevent a potential attack by malicious software against 
the isolation kernel.
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The isolation layer – What TC can do
• Security of software running in protected domains supported by 
the isolation layer:
– Confidentiality and integrity of application code and data:
• Memory protection to prevent software attack during execution;
• Sealing to enable the detection of software modification during 
storage;
• DMA-protection to prevent physical attacks which may allow software 
controls to be bypassed, thereby enabling an attack by malicious
software;
• Protected inter process communication (IPC) – a program should be 
able to exchange data with another program so that the integrity and 
confidentiality of the data is assured.
Helps prevent a potential attack by malicious software.
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Peripheral security – What TC can do
• Trusted path to the user in order to ensure the confidentiality 
and integrity of user input:
– Prevents malicious applications from displaying a faked dialogue, 
e.g. to capture a user password;
– Prevents user input from being read/copied or altered by a 
malicious application.
Helps prevent a potential attack by malicious software.
• Secure channel to output devices to ensure integrity of output 
can be assured.
Helps prevent a potential attack by malicious software.
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The TPM – What TC can do
• Persistent storage:
– Encrypted data protected from malicious code;
– Insurance that data can only be accessed within a certain 
environment.
Helps prevent some of the fall out from an attack by malicious 
software.
• Secure boot:
– While not described within the TCG v1.2 specifications, all the 
necessary elements are in place to implement such a service.
Helps prevent the fall out from an attack by malicious software.
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The TPM – What TC can do
• Attestation:
– Enables a platform challenger to verify what versions of software 
are running on a platform;
– Can be used to check whether or not the latest anti-virus 
definitions have been downloaded.
Helps prevent some of the fall out from an attack by malicious 
software.
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The TPM – What TC can do
• Software may be built to leverage the TPM security 
mechanisms:
– Many software security problems arise from misuse of 
cryptography: 
• Misuse of randomness:
– many programs require sources of randomness;
– most common method of generating “randomness” is to use a 
deterministic pseudo-random generator;
– must be designed and implemented well – simply counting the 
milliseconds since midnight on the system clock is not normally good 
enough!
• Poor key management:
– cryptographic key management is a complex issue; 
– cannot properly protect long cryptographic keys with potentially weak 
short passwords.
• Customised cryptography.
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Microsoft Vista security features
• BitLocker – secure drive encryption using TPM features.
• BitLocker only available in Enterprise version of Vista.
• Almost certainly because it is very dangerous to users unless a 
proper backup strategy is also deployed.
• Visa also supports a TPM-based ‘partial’ secure boot.
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Windows Vista BitLocker (1)
• BitLocker Drive Encryption (BDE) designed to protect data from 
offline viewing – uses a v1.2 TPM:
– There is a potentially huge threat from offline attacks against PC 
data, particularly on notebook PCs;
– Bonus: secure decommissioning by deleting the keys!
• Two volume categories:
– System volume (unencrypted)
• MBR, Boot manager and utilities
– OS volume
• OS, page/temp/hibernation file, data
• Five default key storage options:
– TPM, TPM+PIN, TPM+USB, USB, Recovery password
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Windows Vista BitLocker (2)
TPM FVEK
SRK
PIN USB
Windows OS Volume
FVEK
backup
decrypt
Network or WWW Server
System Volume
• When first starting BDE:
– BDE verifies the partition layout and that the TPM is activated;
– User selects his/her desired recovery backup method;
– BDE encrypts the OS volume.
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A crypto chip in every PC
• Putting a TPM on every PC motherboard means that every PC 
will have a crypto chip, with secure key storage, a random 
number generator, …
• Possible security applications for such a chip are almost endless.
• For example, currently there are PC crypto boards available.
• These can be used to make a PC into a secure system, e.g. to:
– run a Certification Authority as part of a PKI;
– to perform key management functions for a company network;
– …
• In some cases, the TPM may be sufficiently secure to avoid the 
need for a separate crypto board.
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Managing distributed systems
• In the long term, one of the key roles envisaged for trusted 
computing is to enable the secure management of distributed 
systems (especially in a corporate setting).
• One node in the distributed system can test the level of security 
offered by another node before deciding what types of task it 
can safely delegate to that node.
• That is, security policies can be automatically enforced.
• However, there is a long way to go …
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Other applications
• A huge variety of applications have been suggested for trusted 
computing functionality.
• Examples include:
– secure signature generation;
– digital rights management (DRM);
– secure identities for peer-to-peer computing;
– control of personal information;
– …
• However, what will actually happen is far from clear!
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Resources
• www.trustedcomputinggroup.org
• http://www.microsoft.com/windowsvista/default.aspx
• http://www.intel.com/technology/security/
• http://os.inf.tu-dresden.de/L4/LinuxOnL4/
• http://www.opentc.net/
• Siani Pearson (editor), Trusted Computing Platforms – TCPA 
Technology in Context, HP Invent.
• Chris Mitchell (editor), Trusted Computing, IEE (London), 2005.
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